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Outside and inside competition for international organizations —
from analysis to innovations
Abstract
The analysis of the competitive environment - monopoly, oligopoly or many competitors -in which
international organizations act, has been neglected in scholarly research. Both this external and the
internal type of competition in international organizations are rather weak and performance is far from
ideal. To strengthen both types of competition, several tentative proposals are advanced. They range
from the introduction of an international competition agency, the use of prediction markets, matching
contributions, to the employment of elements of direct democracy via randomly elected trustees. These
proposals are put forward to stimulate discussion and to advance new ideas about the design of
international organizations.
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This paper intends to make two contributions: 
Firstly, it wants to call attention to the competitive environment – monopoly, 
oligopoly or many competitors –in which international organizations act, and 
which affects their performance.  
Secondly, this paper wants to move from analysis to policy by making several 
proposals that are designed to strengthen both internal and external competition. 
Both aspects seem to have been rather neglected in scholarly research. 
 
I. Analyzing International Organizations from the Point of View of 
Competition. 
 
The term “international organization” is used in a broad sense here1; it 
encompasses both IGOs (International Governmental Organizations, such as the 
UN, EU, IMF or IBRD) and INGOs (International Non-Governmental 
Organizations, i.e. umbrella organizations such as the World Council of Churches 
or the European Trade Union Confederations; it also includes non-profit-oriented 
transnational organizations such as the International Olympic Committee, Amnesty 
International, Greenpeace or Transparency International. Standard economic 
theory sees the reason for international governmental organizations to exist mainly 
or even exclusively in the provision of public goods leading to more or less free 
riding (e.g. Congleton 2006). No international organizations are needed for the 
provision of international private goods and services; global firms and international 
private interest groups are able to provide the respective services. 
This approach faces the problem that nearly all of international activities are, to 
some extent, subject to free riding and to positive or negative external effects. The 
existence of an international organization is less determined by the “nature” of the 
good or service provided but rather does depend on how far property rights are 
assigned within the international sphere. Transactions costs as well as political 
interests of national governments, private interest groups and existing international 
organizations play a major role. These considerations imply that any international 
activity can be provided on a wide spectrum, from purely private to public 
organization. The standard economic approach, which sets out by examining the 
character of goods (private or public), is of only limited usefulness. This 
conclusion is buttressed by two additional considerations. Even in the case of 
(pure) international public goods private supply does remain possible due to pro-
social preferences of individuals who voluntarily contribute2. Pertinent examples 
are the many humanitarian organizations that are active in the international sphere. 
Moreover, in the case of some international public goods, government interference 
is unwanted or even rejected. For example, the Red Cross, one of the main actors 
supplying international public goods, emphasizes its independence and autonomy 
from national governments, even though it is heavily financed by them. Modern 
                                                 
1 For an extensive, but incomplete list see “List of International Organizations” in 
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_international_organizations; Non-
governmental organizations; International_organization) all accessed January 29th, 
2008. 
2 For the large literature on the voluntary provision of international public goods see 
e.g. Murdoch and Sandler (1997) and Barrett (2007). 
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Political Economy that focuses on internationally active individuals and 
organizations and follows a comparative approach provides a more useful means to 
the analysis of international organizations than the standard economic approach 
does (as has already been argued by Vaubel 1986).  
This paper, based on Political Economy, focuses on the concept of competition in 
two different ways: 
- External competition (section II), i.e. the extent to which the markets for 
international organizations are open to or can be contested by outsiders; 
- Internal competition (section III), i.e. the extent to which the preferences of 
the citizens are reflected in the actions taken by international organizations. 
The analysis comes to the conclusion that both types of competition are severely 
lacking. Therefore, a number of innovations are suggested. They intend to mitigate 
the restricted competition. Section IV advances several proposals to strengthen 
external and internal competition in the international realm. They are, as will be 
seen, rather unconventional and are intended to stimulate the scientific discourse. 
Section V concludes. 
 
II. External Competition 
 
External competition refers to the extent to which the international market is 
“contestable” both with respect to entry and exit. It must be analyzed how easily 
new international organizations, or international organizations active in a different 
field, may enter the market. The costs to enter may be prohibitive, in which case a 
particular international organization has a monopoly on the market. It is not easy to 
find a convincing example of such an international monopoly. With respect to 
some issues, the United Nations has a monopoly. But in many respects this 
monopoly is challenged by competing international organizations, for example by 
the “major” nations (the G7, G8, G10 etc.) convening in separate meetings outside 
the UN framework. In many international areas market entry is encumbered by 
substantial costs and the international market is populated by a small number of 
organizations providing the same or similar goods. The market is then 
characterized by oligopolistic competition. Examples in the humanitarian field are 
“Amnesty International” and “Human Rights Watch”, both organizations that care 
for prisoners and detainees. In the field of peacekeeping operations the United 
Nations, the European Union, NATO and several other international organizations 
are sometimes simultaneously engaged. When entry costs are low a large number 
of international organizations are competing with each other. Examples are the 
many humanitarian institutions simultaneously working to relieve poverty and 
hunger, and to help in the aftermath of natural disasters. “Contestability” also 
refers to the cost of exiting a market. This concept makes immediate sense in the 
case of private profit-oriented firms. These must consider whether they can take 
the profits with them and invest them elsewhere, or whether they are locked in. 
This has been the case in some developing countries where the national legislation 
prohibits the repatriation of profits. Of course, firms take such restrictions into 
account and consequently may shy back from foreign direct investments. The 
concept is less straightforward in the case of non-profit oriented international 
organizations. However, to the extent that inside competition is muted, employees 
of international organizations are able to derive rents they might hope to repatriate. 
If, for some reason, this possibility is curtailed, the relevant decision makers in 
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international organizations will shy away from engaging in the particular area or 
country.     
The entry and exit costs for international markets are important aspects to consider, 
but they do not fully determine the number of all competing international 
organizations. Contestability is not exogenously given but is subject to the 
manipulations of various actors. In particular, existing international organizations 
and national governments often make strong efforts to restrict market access by 
raising costs. Politicians and employees engaged in international organizations 
tend to restrict entry to gain for themselves more prominence, to enjoy a “quiet 
life”, and to create extra rents for their own benefit. A less cynical view is that the 
persons already engaged in a particular international field are convinced that they 
are the most knowledgeable and therewith the best actors, and that newcomers 
would do much worse. For similar reasons, when several providers act in the 
market, cartels tend to be formed in order to prevent “noxious” competition. In 
particular, the field of activity is divided and distributed according to regions and 
specific sub-types of activity.  
As the contestability of an international market is at least partly endogenous, it 
would be mistaken to directly derive the efficiency of international organizations 
from the market form observed. Nevertheless, to analyze and establish how many 
international organizations are active in a particular field is a useful starting point. 
External competition among international organizations should be an important 
area of research. However, this research, to my best knowledge, has rarely been 
undertaken. Two aspects are in need of more analysis: the existing market forms 
and their consequences. 
 
Market form 
First of all, it is essential to closely look at and understand the market form in 
which international organizations act, i.e. the current status and its development 
over time. Which international areas are characterized by monopolies, oligopolies 
and open competition? What is the reason for specific market forms, and do they 
differ from what we know from national markets? How easy is it to establish a new 
international organization, and how often do international organizations disappear? 
Has rapid growth in the number of international organizations (see Frey 1997, 
Vaubel, Dreher and Soylu 2008) occurred in new or rather in established areas? If 
the latter is true, market forms develop in the direction of more competition. Is the 
rising number of international organizations due to newly founded or to existing 
international organizations surviving over a longer period of time? 
These questions are not answered easily but they certainly constitute a worthwhile 
field of scientific inquiry. 
 
Consequences of market forms 
Research should analyze the consequences various market forms may have on the 
size and composition of international goods and services provided. Are there 
monopolistic rents in existence, and if so, how are they created, who gets them, 
and where are they dominant? Does possibly wasteful competition exist, i.e. is the 
effect of the activities of many suppliers additive or sub-additive, perhaps even 
negative? It has sometimes been argued that international lending is a case in point. 
Competing international organizations lending money may provoke a race to the 
bottom by reducing the conditionalities imposed. According to some accounts, the 
many different international organizations involved in relieve efforts after the 
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recent devastating Tsunami disaster may be another example in which too many 
international organizations were engaged. The negative externalities produced by 
the efforts to help, as well as the large fixed set-up costs may well have produced 
poorer results than if only one (or a few) organizations had been active. However, 
this conclusion is far from certain, especially if one takes into account that in 
developed economies the willingness to donate money might well diminish if 
donors do not have the possibility to give to the humanitarian organization of their 
choice. The possibly reduced effectiveness of the aid in the disaster area must be 
compared to the possibly reduced amount of donations. Similarly, politicians and 
public officials of smaller countries may prefer to fund smaller international 
organizations in which they can exert more influence than in large ones, dominated 
by the major national powers. 
These are, in my view, important questions that so far do not seem to have been 
sufficiently addressed by academics.  
 
III. Inside Competition 
 
The stronger the internal political competition is, the more international 
organizations are forced to take into account the preferences of the citizens they 
represent, or of the donors who are funding them. Yet, such internal competition is 
seriously hampered by the fact that donors in most cases have only limited interest 
in what international organizations do3. Their preferences are muted and are rarely 
openly expressed. As a result, it remains unclear how an international organization 
should perform. 
Two aspects of internal competition are important to analyze: the financing of 
international organizations either through donations or by governments, and the 
decision rules within the organizations. 
 
Financing 
There are many non-governmental international organizations that are financed 
through donations. This forces the directors of these organizations to comply with 
the wishes of their benefactors. However, most donors are not much interested in 
what organizations actually do but are motivated by the “warm glow” they feel 
when they become benefactors. They tend to not monitor the activities of the 
organizations but believe what the organizations proclaim. This induces the 
organizations to spend a large share of their revenue on propaganda, and only a 
small share on their stated purpose, an aspect pointed out by Tullock (1967) a long 
time ago. Some potential donors have reacted by informing themselves about the 
activities of international organizations through certified controllers. Their task is 
simplified when the performances of competing organizations can be compared. 
The problem of a limited demand for information by donors, and a limited 
capability to monitor the activities, nevertheless remains. This allows privately 
financed international organizations to enjoy considerable liberties and 
discretionary room to exploit donors to their advantage. 
Difficulties arise in the many instances in which governments finance 
international organizations. Usually bureaucratic, input oriented rules are applied 
                                                 
3 An exception are large scandals, which decision makers of international 
organizations go through great trouble to avoid, and even more so, to suppress the 
surfacing of the respective information. 
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but such rules tend to lead to inefficiencies and distortions. International 
organizations receive a steady flow of revenue independent and regardless of their 
performance. As a consequence they have an incentive to inflate expenditures to 
conform to the revenue flow, or even to worsen the problems they are supposed to 
remedy. But such rules have the advantage of being easy to administrate and are 
therefore often used (e.g. in the United Nations system). 
The situation differs when funding is made dependent on the performance of an 
international organization. Such funding is incentive compatible and induces the 
leaders of international organizations to act in the interest of the governments 
financing them. This would be the case if an environmental organization were to 
be funded according to the improvements in the environment produced, or a peace 
promoting organization corresponding to the achieved reduction in the probability 
of wars. Such a financing procedure is extremely difficult to administrate, as it is 
necessary to clearly identify the contribution made by the respective international 
organization. The same problem arises when international organizations are given 
the right to tax individuals and firms in accordance with the benefits achieved. 
Such financing is again incentive compatible. However, if it is difficult to identify 
the contribution of an organization it will lead to distortions. If a particular 
organization is credited with the improvement of a particular global problem (say, 
if the condition of the environment has been improved along some dimension) but 
if this improvement is due to external factors (e.g. a business downturn), or if 
other actors and organizations are in fact responsible for the improvement, the 
funding of the organization is wasteful and leads to the survival of international 
organizations that do not perform a useful activity.  
 
Decision Rules 
The extent, to which the preferences of citizens are reflected in the actions of 
international organizations, depends decisively on the institution’s decision 
making. They determine the relationship between the citizens as principals and the 
actors in international organizations as agents. This specific principal-agent 
relationship is far more complicated than in firms or in national governments 
(Vaubel 2006, Michaelowa and Borrmann 2007). There are many more steps in 
this relationship between the citizens and these actors. Under democratic 
conditions, citizens elect a national parliament, which in turn elects a government. 
The government, or rather the specific ministries in charge, will select delegates 
who will represent the national interests in the international organization. The 
leaders of international organizations are supposed to follow the decisions made 
by the delegates of the member countries. They charge their officials in the centre 
to devise the corresponding policies, which then have to be communicated to the 
employees in the field. There are thus several layers to the principal-agent 
relationship that provide international organizations with a considerable 
discretionary room and allow them to act in an inefficient and wasteful way 
(Vaubel 2006, Frey and Gygi 1991, Frey 1997). The principal-agent relationship 
between national delegates and the leaders of an international organization is 
strengthened when the share of votes corresponds to the share of money 
contributed, such as in the UN financial organizations, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. As a result there is a dominant “shareholder”, the 
United States, interested in the international organization’s efficiency (Vaubel 
1996). It may, however, be argued that these organizations act in the interest of 
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the dominant shareholder rather than in the interest of a more global community 
(see e.g. Dreher and Jensen 2007). 
 
IV. A Plea for Innovative Proposals 
 
The analysis suggests that both internal and external competition for international 
organizations is rather weak and that their performance is far from ideal. There 
exists considerable room for improvement. Despite the fact that our analytical 
knowledge about the workings of international organizations is still quite limited, it 
seems possible to advance proposals designed to strengthen competition and 
hopefully make international organizations perform better. The scope of 
institutional innovations has not been sufficiently explored; indeed it seems to me 
that researchers in the field accept the status quo too readily. I wish to argue that 
for researchers an important and somewhat neglected objective should be bringing 
forth new ideas, even if they are only partial, and their success uncertain. 
 
To illustrate the potential usefulness of improving the performance of international 
organizations, I advance six proposals that could serve as input in a scholarly 
discourse process, and later on could be used as a possible building block for the 
construction of new institutions, and the improvement of existing ones. 
 
External competition can be strengthened through the following proposals: 
 
Proposal 1: International Competition Agency 
Create a competition agency that assumes the task of identifying and suppressing 
entry barriers into markets for international organizations. This agency should also 
identify under which specific conditions competition among international 
organizations is wasteful, taking into account all relevant considerations. Moreover 
it could be given the task of coordinating the competitive activities of independent 
international organizations, whose uncoordinated action have led to undesirable 
results in the past.  
 
The structure of an international competition agency would be similar to that of 
existing competition agencies in national markets. However, the experiences with 
such agencies have not always been positive and the results are not beyond 
criticism. It has been argued that these agencies could get “captured” by particular 
strong interests. There lurks a danger that a competition agency for international 
organizations could become subservient to national governments and existing 
interest groups. If this indeed happens, coordinating activities by the international 
competition agency would worsen conditions. They might well result in favouring 
politically well connected, but inefficient international organizations. On the other 
hand, possibly efficient but politically powerless, international organizations might 
be excluded. An undisputedly positive contribution of an international competition 
agency may provide useful information on international market conditions. 
 
 
 
Proposal 2: International Competition Rules 
Expand international law to strengthen and open markets for international 
organizations and to curb the exploitation through monopolistic and oligopolistic 
 8 
providers, including cartels. An independent international competition court 
prevents the violation of competition rules. 
 
This proposal adopts existing international law with respect to human rights, and 
the respective Court in The Hague, which has been established by a voluntary 
constitutional consensus among most countries in the world. Even though the 
Court does not function perfectly, it is still true that as a rule even the most 
powerful countries - which could not be forced into compliance – honour the 
international legal arrangements. Many nations may come to the conclusion that it 
is in their long-term best interest to follow the rules, and to respect the 
independence of the Court. Even if some countries sometimes do not behave 
according to the rules agreed upon, the constitutional consensus need not break 
down but may survive. 
 
The next four proposals seek to strengthen internal competition. 
 
Proposal 3: Using Prediction Markets to Provide Information4 
A fundamental problem of international organizations is that management is often 
badly informed, not only about the principals’ desire, but also about what can be 
done and how it can be achieved. Prediction markets may help to overcome this 
informational gap and allow managers to utilize the decentralized nature of 
information. Many people have a wealth of personal knowledge about international 
organizations but do so only in an extremely incomplete and partial way. 
Prediction markets give individuals an incentive to share the information they have 
and to put it at the disposal of a centre, which aggregates this information. Under 
these conditions the aggregate information gained is superior to other sources of 
information that are often even more incomplete and distorted.  
Prediction markets could, for example, be used when an international organization 
considers engaging in a major new area, or intends to strongly step up its activities 
in the traditional area. The information collected via a prediction market makes use 
of the often extensive and intimate knowledge of specialists and gives them a 
positive and profitable experience and an occasion to bring it forth. 
 
Prediction markets have first been used, often with good results, to predict the 
outcome of elections (see Berg et al. 2008 and Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). As 
participants obtain a monetary gain by predicting well, they have an incentive to 
provide an objective evaluation of what party or person will win an election rather 
than supplying an ideologically biased opinion. The technique has been used with 
good results in many firms. Employees are encouraged to share their “best” 
evaluation of a planned policy in order to predict as accurately as possible the 
eventual outcome, and to therewith win the competition (see Plott and Chen 2002). 
Obviously, such prediction markets are only possible for certain issues and not for 
others.  
 
 
Proposal 4: Matching Contributions 
Each citizen is free to make contributions out of his or her private pocket to the 
various international organizations. The national government will match these 
                                                 
4 I owe this proposal to Felix Oberholzer-Gee. 
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donations by a given factor. Say, in addition, it contributes ten times the total sum 
earmarked by taxpayers. In order to secure their funding, the international 
organizations are forced to inform citizens of what they do, what they have 
achieved in the past and what they plan to do in the future. Those organizations 
that are best able to convince the citizens that their donations will be spent wisely 
can expect to receive the most funds. The principal-agent relationship is thereby 
strengthened. 
Introducing matching contributions may tempt international organizations to spend 
excessive sums on popularizing their activities instead of doing the actual work. It 
should be noted that every recipient of government funds faces such temptation but 
it normally applies to a small group of relevant decision makers rather than the 
whole population of citizens. To impress the former may be cheaper than if the 
latter have to be addressed. The problem is, however, that democratic rules demand 
that the preferences of the citizens as principals have to be respected and not those 
of their agents. 
Matching contributions have the disadvantage that the weight of the decision is 
proportional to the size of the contribution and, therefore, to income and wealth. 
To overcome this undemocratic feature each citizen may be given the right to 
distribute a given sum of money (say 1000 Euros) among the various international 
organizations and allot these contributions when filling out his or her return. The 
government then distributes all contributions among the international organizations 
according to the percentage breakdown determined by the citizens. 
 
 
Proposal 5: Popular Participation Rights and Random Selection of Trustees 
The fundamental principal-agent problem that has been identified can be mitigated 
if citizens directly elect delegates and major decisions are determined through 
popular referenda. The latter include both a mandatory or optional vote, as well as 
popular initiatives to put an issue on the agenda. The “trustees” are chosen from 
the total population in each country through a random drawing. The number of 
trustees elected for each country can be proportional to population size or to any 
other criterion chosen (Frey and Stutzer 2006). 
 
This proposal is inspired by the favourable experiences made in semi-direct 
democracies such as Switzerland5. It might be argued that under these conditions 
interest groups will try to influence the decisions of the trustees, while in non-
democratic countries the rulers force trustees to vote in accordance with the rulers’ 
demands. This is true but no worse than present conditions in which the national 
delegates are subject to the same pressures. Indeed, to be elected trustee may 
provide a measure of autonomy, especially if voting is anonymous. 
 
 
 
Proposal 6: Institutionalized Devil’s Advocate. 
Governments intending to form an international organization agree to establish 
also the position of a devil’s advocate whose task it will be to discover the flaws in 
                                                 
5 For the institution of direct democracy see e.g. Kriesi 2005, for econometric 
analyses of their consequences on production see Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz 
1999, and on happiness Frey and Stutzer 2002. 
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the major decisions made and also to produce sound and powerful arguments 
against propositions offered by the leaders of international organizations. The 
devil’s advocate must be independent and must derive his or her prestige from 
doing his or her job well, and disclosing the weaknesses any policy might have. 
This is a powerful antidote to group thinking and other distortions in policy 
making. An office specifically assigned to this task may also achieve these same 
results, provided it is truly independent of the international organization that is to 
be monitored. Moreover, the incentives of its members must be clearly defined and 
well structured. The persons working in such an office must be able to successfully 
pursue their career and do their job unhindered even if they are highly critical of 
the activities of the international organization in question.  
 
The institution of advocatus diaboli has proven its usefulness in the Catholic 
Church, where it has served as an institutionalized opposition to an excessive 
creation of saints, which would be damaging for the Church in the long run. Only 
those persons are sanctified, about whom the advocatus diaboli, despite serious 
effort, could not find any negative aspects. This institution had worked well but 
was undermined by the former pope John Paul II with the result that under his 
reign more saints than ever before in the history of the church were created. Many 
observers find this practice to be inflationary and against the interests of the 
church. 
A disadvantage of the devil’s advocate is its inherent negative role as opponent. 
This may be overcome by giving the person in charge the right to advance 
counterproposals. The institution then closely resembles the popularly elected 
commissions of account (“Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen”). These institutions 
have been empirically shown to discipline governments and to induce them to 
come closer to voters’ preferences (Eichenberger and Schelker 2007). 
 
V. Analysis and Normative Proposals 
 
The analysis of international organizations suggests that existing internal and 
external competition in international organizations is rather weak and that their 
performance is far from ideal. There is considerable room for improvement. To 
strengthen competition, six proposals are advanced. Some of them refer to rather 
fundamental aspects, some of them to less significant ones. These proposals are 
introduced in order to stimulate new ideas and innovations with respect to 
international organizations, an aspect somewhat neglected in the scholarly 
literature. The proposals advanced here are only preliminary and far from being 
immediately applicable. They only serve as examples and intend to stimulate the 
academic discussion process. There are, of course, many other innovations that 
have been advanced (an example would be Mueller’s 1978 decision making 
mechanism using “Voting by Veto”) or could be advanced in the future. 
New ideas are quite generally met with scepticism and it is difficult to put them 
into practice. By design, they oppose the interests of the usually well-established 
interest groups and are therefore not welcomed or easily accepted. New ideas do 
not necessarily represent an improvement; sometimes they are even worse than 
what already exists and, therefore, are rightly rejected. Despite these basic 
difficulties it still seems useful that social scientists bring forth unconventional, 
new proposals because they may have an impact in the future. Examples of this are 
the trading in environmental rights or the introduction of road pricing which, for a 
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long time, have been ridiculed by politicians and the general public, but now have 
been adopted in several countries. Some careful optimism is warranted that new 
ideas have a chance, also in the case of international organizations.    
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